<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>ACM Queue - Security</title>
    <link>http://queue.acm.org/listing.cfm?item_topic=Security&amp;qc_type=topics_list&amp;filter=Security&amp;page_title=Security&amp;order=desc</link>
    <description />
    <item>
      <title>Time Protection in Operating Systems and Speaker Legitimacy Detection</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3344779</link>
      <description>Timing-based side-channel attacks are a particularly tricky class of attacks to deal with because the very thing you're often striving for can give you away. There are always more creative new instances of attacks to be found, so you need a principled way of thinking about defenses that address the class, not just a particular instantiation. That's what Ge et al. give us in "Time Protection, the Missing OS Abstraction." Just as operating systems prevent spatial inference through memory protection, so future operating systems will need to prevent temporal inference through time protection. It's going to be a long road to get there.&#xD;
&#xD;
The second paper chosen for this edition comes from NDSS'19 (Network and Distributed System Security Symposium) and studies the physiological and social implications of the ever-improving abilities of voice-imitation software. It seems people may be especially vulnerable to being fooled by fake voices. "The crux of voice (in)security: a brain study of speaker legitimacy detection," by Neupane et al., is a fascinating study with implications far beyond just the technology.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jul 2019 13:53:09 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Adrian Colyer</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3344779</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Security for the Modern Age</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3301253</link>
      <description>Giving operators a usable means of securing the methods they use to deploy and run applications is a win for everyone. Keeping the usability-focused abstractions provided by containers, while finding new ways to automate security and defend against attacks, is a great path forward.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Dec 2018 14:03:04 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Jessie Frazelle</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3301253</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Understanding Database Reconstruction Attacks on Public Data</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3295691</link>
      <description>With the dramatic improvement in both computer speeds and the efficiency of SAT and other NP-hard solvers in the last decade, DRAs on statistical databases are no longer just a theoretical danger. The vast quantity of data products published by statistical agencies each year may give a determined attacker more than enough information to reconstruct some or all of a target database and breach the privacy of millions of people. Traditional disclosure-avoidance techniques are not designed to protect against this kind of attack.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2018 14:20:38 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Simson Garfinkel, John M. Abowd, Christian Martindale</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3295691</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Live in a Post-Meltdown and -Spectre World</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3281471</link>
      <description>Spectre and Meltdown create a risk landscape that has more questions than answers. This article addresses how these vulnerabilities were triaged when they were announced and the practical defenses that are available. Ultimately, these vulnerabilities present a unique set of circumstances, but for the vulnerability management program at Goldman Sachs, the response was just another day at the office.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Sep 2018 13:53:05 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Rich Bennett, Craig Callahan, Stacy Jones, Matt Levine, Merrill Miller, Andy Ozment</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3281471</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reducing the Attack Surface</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3161600</link>
      <description>The best way to reduce the attack surface of a piece of software is to remove any unnecessary code. Since you now have two teams demanding that you leave in the code, it's probably time to think about making two different versions of your binary. The application sounds like it's an embedded system, so I'll guess that it's written in C and take it from there.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2017 11:54:20 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>George Neville-Neil</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3161600</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bitcoin's Academic Pedigree</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3136559</link>
      <description>We've seen repeatedly that ideas in the research literature can be gradually forgotten or lie unappreciated, especially if they are ahead of their time, even in popular areas of research. Both practitioners and academics would do well to revisit old ideas to glean insights for present systems. Bitcoin was unusual and successful not because it was on the cutting edge of research on any of its components, but because it combined old ideas from many previously unrelated fields. This is not easy to do, as it requires bridging disparate terminology, assumptions, etc., but it is a valuable blueprint for innovation.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2017 15:56:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Arvind Narayanan, Jeremy Clark</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3136559</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>IoT: The Internet of Terror</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3121440</link>
      <description>It is true that many security-focused engineers can sound like Chicken Little, running around announcing that the sky is falling, but, unless you've been living under a rock, you will notice that, indeed, the sky IS falling. Not a day goes by without a significant attack against networked systems making the news, and the Internet of Terror is leading the charge in taking distributed systems down the road to hell - a road that you wish to pave with your good intentions.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jul 2017 16:15:32 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>George Neville-Neil</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">3121440</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Internal Access Controls</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2697395</link>
      <description>Every day seems to bring news of another dramatic and high-profile security incident, whether it is the discovery of longstanding vulnerabilities in widely used software such as OpenSSL or Bash, or celebrity photographs stolen and publicized. There seems to be an infinite supply of zero-day vulnerabilities and powerful state-sponsored attackers. In the face of such threats, is it even worth trying to protect your systems and data? What can systems security designers and administrators do?</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2014 22:35:01 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Geetanjali Sampemane</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">2697395</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Quality Software Costs Money - Heartbleed Was Free</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2636165</link>
      <description>The world runs on free and open-source software, FOSS for short, and to some degree it has predictably infiltrated just about any software-based product anywhere in the world.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2014 15:23:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Poul-Henning Kamp</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">2636165</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who Must You Trust?</title>
      <link>http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2630691</link>
      <description>In his novel The Diamond Age, author Neal Stephenson describes a constructed society (called a phyle) based on extreme trust in one's fellow members. Part of the membership requirements is that, from time to time, each member is called upon to undertake certain tasks to reinforce that trust. For example, a phyle member might be told to go to a particular location at the top of a cliff at a specific time, where he will find bungee cords with ankle harnesses attached. The other ends of the cords trail off into the bushes. At the appointed time he is to fasten the harnesses to his ankles and jump off the cliff. He has to trust that the unseen fellow phyle member who was assigned the job of securing the other end of the bungee to a stout tree actually did his job; otherwise, he will plummet to his death. A third member secretly watches to make sure the first two don't communicate in any way, relying only on trust to keep tragedy at bay. Whom you trust, what you trust them with, and how much you trust them are at the center of the Internet today, as well as every other aspect of your technological life.</description>
      <category>Security</category>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2014 16:14:17 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>Thomas Wadlow</author>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">2630691</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

