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Originally published in Queue vol. 7, no. 8—
see this item in the ACM Digital Library
Olivia Angiuli, Joe Blitzstein, Jim Waldo - How to De-identify Your Data
Balancing statistical accuracy and subject privacy in large social-science data sets
Jim Waldo, Alan Ramos, Weina Scott, William Scott, Doug Lloyd, Katherine O'Leary - A Threat Analysis of RFID Passports
Do RFID passports make us vulnerable to identity theft?
Katie Shilton - Four Billion Little Brothers?
Participatory sensing technologies could improve our lives and our communities, but at what cost to our privacy?
David Sohn - Understanding DRM
The explosive growth of the Internet and digital media has created both tremendous opportunities and new threats for content creators. Advances in digital technology offer new ways of marketing, disseminating, interacting with, and monetizing creative works, giving rise to expanding markets that did not exist just a few years ago. At the same time, however, the technologies have created major challenges for copyright holders seeking to control the distribution of their works and protect against piracy.
As to the CDR, VoIP users pretty much have all their CDR data available to them via a web interface. I know that's the case with my Vonage account, and my MagicJack does the same. It's saved my bacon a couple of times when I needed to lookup a number of someone who called. But I know that law enforcement has full access to it. It's all innocuous anyhow but I object to the open peeping going on.
The "cloud" concept is asking end users and businesses to trust providers that have, at best, marginal legal containment in the country of origin and even less so abroad, with the best example Google who has pioneered mass intrusion of privacy (allegedly non-evil, of course). Have a look at their Terms of Service, clause 11 - they have even afforded themselves the ability to take your information elsewhere..
Couple with that an interesting deficiency in Data Protection laws: if a business collects data from a user, purpose has to be specified and maintained. If a business collects data about a user from ANOTHER user, considerably less controls apply - and who is going to check compliance in the countries with notification duty? What happens to facial recognition name tags in their web albums? Do they really stay in the account or will they be used to find other occurrences in the vast Google haystack?
Now extrapolate: add an ECHELON and a Carnivore, sorry, DCS-3000 feed to Google and friends (Facebook?) and hey, presto, another NSA. Legally so. Voluntarily so - and our kids grow up thinking this is acceptable.
There is nothing wrong with legally sanctioned surveillance - police and other security services cannot function without - provided there is cause, oversight, transparency, control and, ultimately, accountability. Otherwise it's maybe time to stop pretending to be a democracy.
Numerous allegations have been made for instance that Verint and Amdocs, two Israeli companies that provide interception equipment to US and other governments, have deliberately introduced backdoors in their systems that give Israeli intelligence wide access to domestic communications inside the US.
I unplugged the RJ-45 ethernet cable to my G5 Mac Pro. The network traffic went HIGHER than what bayarea.net ADSL went, and I was unplugged. I thought "this is magic" at the time...
> two Israeli companies that provide interception equipment to > US and other governments, have deliberately introduced > backdoors in their systems that give Israeli intelligence wide > access to domestic communications inside the US.
Yes, we would the standard PC Indignant Interruptive "YOU mean sir-or-MA'AM!!!" from a caller now and then, but this was the Navy--not a college campus. The sex of the Commanding Officer--not the synthetic outrage of the caller--set the default. My point is the "non-secure line" statement. It reminded the caller discussing classified info was inappropriate, and better to err on the side of caution than on the side of convenience.
I already tag my "automatic-signature" in e-mail with a similar caveat; e-mail is about as private as would be "tagging" a passing truck or railcar with your message. It might be time to add "This is a non-secure phone" to your usual word(s) when answering a phone, whether it's a wired landline or something else. It would remind the caller AND would remind "Big Sibling" we know she-or-he is watching. Best regards.